The Decision
The Divisional Court found that the disparity was not large enough to establish a prime facie case. They went on the hold that if there were a prime facie case, the Secretary of State had failed to justify the Order. The Court of Appeal found that there was a prime facie case and that the Secretary of State had failed to justify the Order. The House of Lords referred the case to the ECJ to rule on, inter alia: (1) the degree of disparity necessary to establish a prime facie case; (2) at what point in time the Order should be assessed, for instance, when it came into force (1985) or when Ms Seymour-Smith was dismissed (1991); and (3) the test for justification of a Government measure. The case then returned to the House of Lords for a final decision.
The House of Lords found against Ms Seymour-Smith. But this unanimous decision was not straightforward. A majority (Lords Nicholls, Goff and Jauncey) held that Ms Seymour-Smith had made out a prime facie case, but that the Secretary of State had justified the Order. The minority (Lords Slynn and Steyn) found that the difference was not considerable, and so no prime facie case had been made out. They did not consider the issue of justification. This is how the House of Lords dealt with each question of law:
( 1) Degree of disparity
It was common ground that any disparity would have to be 'considerable' for a prime facie case. However, the ECJ defined the word 'considerable' liberally. After stating that a difference had to be considerable, 
Time of assessment
The ECJ noted that it might be appropriate to look at the figures compiled after 1985 for an indication of the impact on women, [7] and ruled that it was for the national court, taking into account the circumstances, to decide at what point in time the Order should be assessed. The House of Lords assessed the Order as things stood in 1991, the time of the Ms Seymour-Smith's dismissal.
Application of the law in the House of Lords
The ECJ commented that if the assessment were made for 1985 alone, there would not be 'on the face of it' a considerable difference. [8] But they did not give an opinion if the assessment were made for 1991. The majority in the House of Lords found that the statistics assessed at 1991 showed a 'considerable' difference between the proportions. Lord Nicholls admitted that the figures were 'in borderline country' but decided:
'I find myself driven to the conclusion that a persistent and constant disparity...in respect of the entire male and female labour forces of this country over a period of seven years cannot be brushed aside and dismissed as insignificant or inconsiderable....I think that these figures are adequate to demonstrate that the extension of the qualifying period had a considerably greater adverse impact on women than men.' [9] For the minority Lord Slynn held that: '…it cannot be said that [the Order] actually affects a considerably higher percentage of women than men…. It would in any event…be odd if there was no discrimination in 1985, but 1991 on a slightly higher percentage on women qualifying (and one as part of a rising trend) there was discrimination.' [10] For the minority the case was dead. Hence only Lord Nicholls' judgement considered the issue of justification.
(3) Justification
Lord Nicholls restated the justification formula provided by the ECJ for this case. A Member State must show that the measure: '(1) ...reflects a legitimate aim of social policy, (2) that that aim is unrelated to any discrimination based on sex, and (3) that the Member State could reasonably consider that the means chosen were suitable for attaining that aim.' [11] Lord Nicholls added some general comments. First, he held that the ECJ's formula showed that the burden (on the Secretary of State) was 'not as heavy as previously thought.' This was because of the absence of the word or 'necessary' in the new formula. Next, Lord Nichols declared that 'Governments must be able to govern' and 'are to be afforded a broad measure of discretion'. [12] Finally, when applying the law of justification, Lord Nicholls took a two-stage approach. First, the introduction of the Order and second, the continuation of it till 1991. It was possible, his Lordship stated, that a measure, 'lawful when adopted, may become unlawful.' [13] On the introduction of the Order, the Government's argument was that it would encourage employment by reducing the risks to employers of 'unjustified involvement' in Unfair Dismissal claims. They relied on several reports, which, on the whole, suggested that a small minority of employers might be inhibited, by the Unfair Dismissal legislation, from taking on staff. Lord Nichols accepted this argument, stating that: 'To condemn the Minister for failing to carry out further research or prepare an impact analysis...would be unreasonable'. [14] Lord Nicholls then turned to the second question of the continuance of the Order. The Government's duty was stated thus:
'...if the Government introduces a measure which proves to have a disparately adverse impact on women, [it] is under a duty to take reasonable steps to monitor the working of the measure. The Government must review the position periodically. The greater the disparity of impact, the greater the diligence can reasonably be expected of the Government.' [15] By 1991 there was no evidence that the Order had increased employment opportunities. However, Lord Nicholls stated that Governments also should be afforded a broad margin of discretion when monitoring such measures. He continued: 'The Government was entitled to allow a reasonable period to elapse before deciding whether the Order had achieved its objective.... The contrary view would impose an unrealistic burden on the Government in the present case.' [16] Thus, the majority held that the Secretary of State had justified the two-year requirement for Unfair Dismissal rights.
Analysis (1) The degree of disparity
The majority showed a fuller understanding than the minority of the ECJ's formula. For the minority, Lord Slynn said -in effect -that if the disparity in 1985 was not considerable, how could it be so in 1991, when the disparity was even closer? He treated each of the six years in isolation, rather than as a whole. That disregards the ECJ's guidance to look for a 'persistent and…constant disparity over a long period'. The majority took the correct approach by assessing, as a whole, the figures for six years.
However, the ECJ formula is not entirely clear. It appears contradictory. On the one hand the disparity must be 'considerable'. On the other, it can be 'less than considerable'. Lord Nicholls attempted to reconcile this by stating -in effect -that a less than considerable disparity over a long period can amount to a considerable disparity. This has the convenience of being consistent with the domestic legislation, which demands a 'considerable difference'. [17] But it has little else in its favour. What happens when another novel case arises, where even the new 'flexible formula' is inappropriate? For instance, a case with a large sample, a marginal impact, but only one set of data: a large company making hundreds redundant, selects part-timers first. The result being that a marginally higher proportion of women are made redundant. Statisticians may testify that the disparity is significant. [19] states that there shall be no discrimination 'whatsoever'. The absoluteness is common to the legislation on equal pay and equal treatment. [20] However, the ECJ has always held [21] that there should be a considerable disparity in cases of indirect discrimination. It appears that the ECJ has diluted the legislation to outlaw only discrimination which is considerable. This seems more peculiar when, in cases of direct discrimination, the courts do not demand a considerable difference in treatment.
The only way to explain this difference is to treat the legislation as a rule of law, and the ECJ guidance as a rule of proof. One of the purposes of proof in cases of indirect discrimination is to prevent prime facie cases being brought, where the disparity is the result of chance. The 'considerable difference' rule can do this in many cases, but not all. That rule should not be used to disqualify genuine cases of discrimination, where the disparity is small (or 'less than considerable'). Seymour-Smith is such a case. The ECJ recognised this when holding that a prime facie case could be established on a lessthan-considerable disparity.
The ECJ may have recognised this, but the House of Lords did not. During his judgement Lord Nicholls said: 'The obligation is to avoid...requirements having a considerable disparity of impact. '[22] The majority found that there had been considerable discrimination, not that there was considerable evidence of discrimination. The minority proceeded on the same basis. Lord Slynn found the figures to be reliable (or not 'fortuitous'). [23] The figures showed that women were disadvantaged. Yet he held there was no discrimination. That can only be explained if he was looking for proof of considerable discrimination, rather than considerable proof of discrimination.
What comes out of this case is not an answer to the first question: 'what degree of disparity was necessary to establish a prime facie case?' Rather, it is a realisation that the rubric 'considerable difference' can be no more than one of several methods of evaluating a prime facie case. A specific answer to the question, say '20 percentage points', [24] would shackle the courts with one narrow rigid definition of indirect discrimination. As we have seen, to do that would deny some legitimate claims and defeat the goal of 'no discrimination 'whatsoever.
Negative or positive figures
Council for Ms Seymour-Smith advanced an alternative comparison. He compared the disadvantaged groups in this case. In 1985, for example, 22.6 per cent of women could not meet the two-year requirement. The figure for men was 31 per cent. Thus for every ten women disadvantaged, there were only seven men. That is clearly a considerable difference. However, all the courts in this case based their decisions on the 'positive' figures. The 'negative' argument is attractive for no other reason than we are dealing with a law to protect those who are disadvantaged by a measure. It is the negative figures that represent them. Nevertheless, the courts preferred the figures representing the most people. However, Lord 
(2) Justification
The standard test for justification is the 'Bilka test.' [27] The defendant must show that the measure corresponds to a genuine need and is suitable and necessary to achieve that need. For the specific class of cases where Governments introduce measures in pursuit of social policy (Seymour-Smith is such a case), it is settled law that the measure must reflect a necessary aim of the social policy and be suitable and necessary for achieving that aim. [28] The ECJ restated this in Seymour-Smith.
[29] The ECJ also noted that although Governments have a broad margin of discretion, it could not be used to frustrate the fundamental principle of equal pay. And with a clear allusion to the Government's defence in this case the ECJ said that 'mere generalisations concerning the capacity of a...measure to encourage recruitment are not enough...' to justify the measure. However, the ECJ's definitive formula, provided in this case (set out above), stated only that the measure should be 'suitable' to achieve the aim. [30] In the House of Lords, Lord Nicholls cited only this last part (the formula) of the ECJ's views on justification. The absence of the word 'necessary' in the formula was enough for Lord Nicholls to conclude that the test was no longer as stringent as previously thought.
[31]
Read as a whole the ECJ's judgement clearly envisages that the measure must be 'necessary' to achieve an aim. It also makes clear that the Order, supported by no more than a generalisation (that if employers have less fear of Unfair Dismissal claims, they will employ more people), was not justified. Even on his less stringent test, Lord Nicholls' decision was surprising. The Government offered no evidence that, after six years, the Order had made any difference to recruitment. If such a policy failed for six years, the Government could cling to no more than hope and political dogma as justification. In these circumstances the Order was not even 'suitable' to encourage recruitment, let alone necessary.
Without Unfair Dismissal rights, a worker can be fired, with proper notice, for no reason. It can be on the whim of the employer. For some fourteen years, [32] hundreds of thousands of British women worked without the protection of Unfair Dismissal rights, which were meanwhile being enjoyed by men. That was solely because of a useless law that achieved nothing bar making a huge number of the female workforce insecure in their jobs. This decision recognised the Government's discretion to maintain such laws.
Conclusion
This case exposed the 'considerable difference' rubric as too rigid to be a rule of law or an exclusive rule of evidence. It should now be read as one of many methods to evaluate statistics. Accordingly, the courts must recognise and act on this. At present, only the European legislation affords the latitude for them to do this. The domestic legislation needs to be amended to suit. The offending phrases in the domestic definitions of indirect discrimination [33] are 'considerably smaller' and 'those who can comply ' . With more open-ended legislation the courts will be free to use appropriate methods to evaluate claims, including the use of 'negative' statistics.
On a sadder note, we must reflect upon the competence and ambition of our senior judges to achieve the goal expressed in the European legislation, of no discrimination 'whatsoever'. The minority misunderstood and misapplied a simple formula of analysing six year's statistics as a whole, by analysing each year in isolation. The majority, when asked to uphold a fundamental principle of European law, collapsed under a Government defence based upon no more than hope and dogma. This does not leave one optimistic about the future of discrimination law, nor for that matter, the Human Rights Act.
